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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
COLTON HUNTER MARLEY,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 45985
ELMORE COUNTY NO. CR-2016-1094

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Colton Hunter Marley pled guilty to felony DUI. He
received an aggregate unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed. After a period of
retained jurisdiction, the district court placed him on probation for ten years.
On appeal, Mr. Marley contends that his felony DUI sentence represents an abuse of the
district court’s discretion, as it is excessive given any view of the facts.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On May 14, 2016, officers responded to a report of a vehicle spinning its tires and driving
on the grass at a park. (R., p.23.) Officers arrived and followed the car. (R., pp.23-24.) They
observed the car speed, run a stop sign, and nearly strike a wall. (R., p.24.) The driver then
tailgated a black SUV and stopped to yell at the driver of that SUV. (R., p.24.) When law
enforcement spoke to the driver, who was identified as Colton Marley, they observed the odor of
an alcoholic beverage. (R., p.24.) Mr. Marley had a prior felony DUI conviction. (R., p.85.)
Witness also reported that the driver had brandished a firearm at them while they were in the
park. (R., p.23.)
Based on these facts, Mr. Marley was charged by Information with one count of felony
DUI, misdemeanor reckless driving, misdemeanor disturbing the peace, and misdemeanor
exhibition of a deadly weapon. (R., pp.64-67.) In another case, Elmore County CR-2017-708,
Mr. Marley was charged with one count of felony injury to jails for breaking a video camera
while in custody, and the cases were set together for arraignment.

(Tr., p.9, Ls.18-22;

R., pp.143-144.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Marley pled guilty with an Alford1 plea to felony DUI,
felony injury to jails, and misdemeanor exhibiting a deadly weapon, and the State agreed not to
file a persistent violator enhancement and to dismiss the remaining misdemeanor charges.
(R., pp.148-165.) The State agreed to recommend ten years, with three years fixed for the DUI
conviction, consecutive to any other case. (R., p.160.) For the injury to jails sentence, the State
agreed to recommend five years indeterminate, consecutive to any other case, but concurrent to

1

Alford v. North Carolina, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
2

the 2016 case. (R., p.160.) Mr. Marley was to be credited for time served in county jail on the
exhibition charge. (R., p.160.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State asked the district court to sentence Mr. Marley on the
felony DUI to a unified term of ten years, with three years fixed, but to retain jurisdiction.
(6/22/17 Tr., p.9, Ls.7-14.) The State asked for five indeterminate years for the felony injury to
jails conviction, concurrent with the DUI but consecutive to any other cases. (6/22/17 Tr., p.9,
Ls.9-14.) Mr. Marley’s counsel asked the district court to sentence Mr. Marley to seven and onehalf years, with two years fixed, for the DUI conviction, and for injuring jails, Mr. Marley’s
counsel asked for two years indeterminate, with the court retaining jurisdiction on both counts.
(6/22/17 Tr., p.11, Ls.12-24.)
Mr. Marley was sentenced to ten years, with three years fixed, on the felony DUI, and
the district court retained jurisdiction. (6/22/17 Tr., p.15, Ls.20-23; R., pp.196-199.) On the
injury to jails count, Mr. Marley was sentenced to five indeterminate years, and the district court
retained jurisdiction. (6/22/17 Tr., p.16, Ls.20-23; R., pp.196-199.) The court ordered the
sentences to be served concurrent to Payette County case number CR 2016-1873. 2 (6/22/17
Tr., p.16, L.24 – p.17, L.4.) After the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended
the sentences and placed Mr. Marley on probation for ten years. (3/12/18 Tr., p.23, Ls.13-17;
R., pp.219-228.) The district court also sentenced Mr. Marley to an additional 60 days in the
county jail due to the issues he had while on the rider. (3/12/18 Tr., p.20, Ls.5-13.)
Mr. Marley filed a notice of appeal timely from the Order Suspending Sentence After
Retained Jurisdiction. (R., pp.229-232.)

2

In Payette County CR-2016-1873, Mr. Marley was convicted of burglary, petit theft, and
providing false information to a law enforcement officer. (R., p.76.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of ten years,
with three years fixed, upon Mr. Marley following his plea of guilty to felony DUI?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it placed Mr. Marley on probation for ten
years?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Ten Years,
With Three Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Marley Following His Plea Of Guilty To Felony DUI
Mr. Marley asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified suspended sentence of ten
years, with three years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court
imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review
of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and
the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Marley does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Marley must show that in light of the
governing criteria, the sentences were excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The
governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:

(1) protection of society; (2)

deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
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In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, Mr. Marley’s sentence is excessive
considering any view of the facts.
Mr. Marley is only 26 years old, but he has long struggled with an addiction to alcohol.
(R., pp.92-93.) He first tried alcohol when he was 11 years old and began drinking regularly
beginning at age 12. (R., pp.92-93.) Mr. Marley has also used methamphetamine. (R., pp.9293.)

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered as a

mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho
89 (1982). In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence based on Nice’s lack of prior
record and the fact that “the trial court did not give proper consideration of the defendant’s
alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested
alternatives for treating the problem.” Id. at 91. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has
ruled that ingestion of drugs and alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate the
criminality of conduct, could be a mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414
(1981). Mr. Marley realizes that his substance abuse is a problem area in his life, and he wants
to stop using drugs and alcohol. (R., p.137.)
Further, Mr. Marley has been diagnosed with ADHD and Generalized Anxiety Disorder.
(R., pp.96, 129-132.)
(R., pp.129-132.)

He was taking medication for the anxiety disorder while in jail.

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the trial court must consider a

defendant’s mental illness as a factor at sentencing. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).
Mr. Marley does have a supportive family to assist him in his rehabilitation. He asked for
treatment so that he could learn to be a contributing member of society and be there to raise and
support his four-year-old daughter. (Tr., p.12, Ls.19-25.) Mr. Marley enjoys spending time with
his daughter, and he “want[s] us to have a good life.” (R., pp.89, 137.)
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Further, Mr. Marley expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for his actions.
(R., pp.148-165.) At his sentencing hearing, Mr. Marley told the court:
Just I’d really appreciate a chance to do the program. Like he was saying, I – I
haven’t – this is the longest I’ve gone without doing drugs maybe since I was 12.
In California, the jails are full of drugs. You do more drugs in jail than on the
streets. And I’ve been in custody now for about 11 months, and I’ve had a lot of
time to think about wanting to change my life.
I have a daughter, she just turned 4. And I just – I really want a – a program.
Like he said, I’ve never had programming. They always just made me do the
time and then get out, and you don’t learn anything from it. I’d appreciate just a
chance for anything, to get some tools to help me be a member of society, a
contributing member, and not just a criminal.
(Tr., p.12, Ls.11-25.)

Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant

expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. Shideler, 103 Idaho at
595; State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Marley asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts that had the district court
properly considered his remorse, family support, and substance abuse/addiction it would have
imposed a less severe sentence.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Placed Mr. Marley On Probation For A Period
Of Ten Years Because This Length Of Time Is Not Reasonably Related To The Goal Of
Rehabilitation
Mr. Marley asserts that, given any view of the facts, his ten-year period of probation is
excessive because this length of time is not reasonably related to the goal of rehabilitation.
Idaho Code § 19-2601 provides that a district court has discretion to suspend the
execution of judgment and place a defendant on probation “under such terms and conditions as it
deems necessary and appropriate. . . .” I.C. § 19-2601(2). A district court has broad discretion
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with regards to probation and generally, it can prescribe the terms and conditions of probation.
State v. Schumacher, 131 Idaho 484, 486 (Ct. App. 1998).
However, a condition of probation must be reasonably related to the purpose of
probation, which is rehabilitation. State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 804, 807 (2004); State v. Dicksen,
152 Idaho 70, 75 (Ct. App. 2011). Idaho Code Section 19-2601(4) does not, however, provide
the trial court with authority to impose arbitrary or unreasonable conditions. Dicksen, 152 Idaho
at 75. A condition of probation that is impossible to fulfill is improper. State v. Sandoval, 92
Idaho 853, 861 (1969); see also State v. Wakefield, 145 Idaho 270, 274 (Ct. App. 2007)
(“Certainly a condition of probation that sets a probationer up for near-certain failure can not be
said to be reasonably related to the ultimate goal of rehabilitation.”). Further, a defendant “may
challenge unreasonable conditions of probation.” State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 162 (2010).
Here, Mr. Marley asserts that a condition of his probation is the actual length of the
probation, which he asserts is excessive for the same reasons identified in Section I. Further,
“[t]he average probation sentence in Idaho is five years. In comparison, the average probation
sentence in the U.S. is three years, or 40 percent shorter.” Council of State Governments Justice
Center,

Justice

Reinvestment

In

Idaho:

Analysis

and

Policy

Framework,

at

https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/document/justice_reinvestment_in_idaho_report (last visited
September 19, 2018).

“Probation sentences in the state are lengthy, yet revocations from

probation tend to occur early in the supervision period.” Id. Here, Mr. Marley was sentenced to
ten years of probation for his non-violent crimes, well in excess of the national average and even
the average probation sentence in Idaho.
In light of the totality of the circumstances, Mr. Marley contends that the period of ten
years to be on probation was not reasonably related to the objective of rehabilitation. Rather, he
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asserts that the condition was unreasonable because there is no indication that it would take ten
years for Mr. Marley to be rehabilitated. It was an unnecessary restriction on his liberty because
during these ten years, he has to comply with the other terms of probation, and if he violates
those terms, he could be sent to prison for up to ten years. A term of ten years is not reasonably
related to curtailing any inclinations Mr. Marley may, or may not have, to commit crimes similar
to the one for which he was convicted. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by
ordering that the probation last ten years, and a shorter term is appropriate.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Marley respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, Mr. Marley respectfully requests that this Court find that the length
of his probation is unreasonable, and reduce the length of probation. Alternatively, he requests
that his case be remanded to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 3rd day of October, 2018.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3rd day of October, 2018, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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